We discuss the recently observed "loophole free" violation of Bell's inequalities in the framework of a physically realist view of quantum mechanics, which requires that physical properties are attributed jointly to a system, and to the context in which it is embedded. This approach is clearly different from classical realism, but it does define a meaningful "quantum realism" from a general philosophical point of view. Consistently with Bell test experiments, this quantum realism embeds some form of non-locality, but does not contain any action at a distance, in agreement with quantum mechanics.
1
This quantum realism has been presented in ref. [7] , under the acronym CSM, standing for Contexts, Systems and Modalities. Here we will briefly summarize its main features, and discuss in more details how to use it to better understand the failure of BH. As it is well known, 1 There is a very old but still alive philosophical debate about what comes first: Are universal and intelligible rules a meaningful idealization of empirical reality, which ought to be considered as the only reality? This approach can be called the Aristotelian point of view. Or are universal and intelligible rules the ultimately real, existing on their own in the realm of Plato's world of Forms? This is usually viewed as the Platonistic approach. We do not have to take a position in this debate, since in our definition of physical reality, the "entities of the natural world" (Aristotelian reality) and the "universal and intelligible rules" (Platonistic reality) are both needed. As physicists we take for granted that the material world has an objective existence independent of observers, and that mathematical concepts are crucial to describe its properties.
this failure of BH corresponds to a rejection of local realism, but not -as we will show -of physical realism. It can rather be considered as an evidence for a quantum realism, which is clearly different from classical realism, and which has some specific non-local feature -however, these features have nothing to do with any "spooky action a distance". Generally speaking, the compatibility of QM with physical realism has been much debated in the literature [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] , giving rise to many different interpretations of QM [20] . In our approach the quantum formalism and physical realism can perfectly coexist, at the price of a subtle but deep change in what is meant by physical properties: they are not any more considered as properties of the system itself, but jointly attributed to the system, and to the context in which it is embedded (definitions will be given below). We will show also that this ontological change has strong links with quantization as a basic physical phenomenon, and that this can explain why QM must be a probabilistic theory. This article is closely related to [7] , with some parts condensed and others expanded, in order to spell out how the CSM approach explains quantum non-locality.
II. SYSTEM, CONTEXT, AND MODALITIES
To define an ontology within the physical framework we are interested in, we will start with the question: which phenomena can we predict with certainty, and obtain repeatedly ? Here certainty and repeatability of phenomena will be used to provide necessary conditions to be able to define a "state". Such an approach, supported by quantum experiments, has a clear relationship with the criteria for physical reality given in 1935 by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) [10] -but the "object" to which it applies will be quite different [12] .
Our quantum ontology involves three different entities. First comes the system, that is a subpart of the world that is isolated well enough to be studied. The system is in contact with other systems, that can be a measuring device, an environment -no need to be more specific at this point. The ensemble of these other systems will be called a context. A given context corresponds to a given set of questions, that can be asked together to the system about its physical properties. A set of answers that can be predicted with certainty and obtained repeatedly within such a context will be called a modality.
Given these definitions, let us bind them together by the following rule: In QM, modalities are attributed jointly to the system and the context. This principle will be called "CSM", referring to the combination of Context, System, and Modality. As a set of certain and repeatable phenomena, a modality fulfills the above conditions for the objective definition of a quantum state, and within the usual QM formalism (which is not here yet), a modality corresponds to a pure state. On the other hand, the context is classical, in the sense that no other context has to be specified to define its state, and within the usual QM formalism, it corresponds to the parameters defining the observables as operators. We note that here neither size, nor a quantitative criterium has been made to draw the quantum-classical boundary: the quantum vs classical behavior is only related to the CSM principle itself, i.e., to the very definition of a modality.
Taking a single polarized photon as an example 2 , the system is the photon, the θ-oriented polarizer is the context, and the two mutually exclusive modalities in this context are either "transmitted", or "reflected". In the CSM perspective, a photon does not "own"a polarization, but the ensemble photon-polarizer does. If the context is known, and if the system is available, a modality defined in this same context can be recovered without error. This property has been exploited for years in quantum communications, and provides the core of quantum cryptography protocols [23] . Here, we draw the consequences of this behavior in ontological terms.
The resulting ontology is clearly different from the classical one, where it is expected that a state should "exist" independently of any context. But even if CSM is fundamentally non-classical, physical realism is not lost: it still pertains to the ensemble made of context, system, and modality. Objectivity, defined as the independence from any particular observer's perception, is still guaranteed, but the "object" comprises both the system and the context, and its "properties" are modalities [16, 17] . 2 Interferences with polarized light (or in the quantum domain, with photon polarization) provides the simplest illustration of our approach. For interferences in the spatial domain, it is more convenient to use also two-mode systems, like the Mach-Zehnder interferometer [21] , where the contexts are either (i) the whichpath detection within the interferometer (with two mutually exclusive modalities : upper path or lower path), or (ii) the interferometer outcome detection. In quantum information, such a system is also known as a "dual rail qubit". Other interferometers like Young's slits, or Fresnel's biprism [22] , are more complicated to analyse because they are multimode systems, with "fringes" where the interference phase depends on the position at the detection screen. Then the outcome can be analyzed in a larger Hilbert space; anyway the structure of mutually exclusive modalities in a given context, and incompatible modalities between different contexts, is a very general framework for all quantum interference experiments.
III. QUANTIZATION AND PROBABILITIES
Now, a basic feature is that in a given context, the modalities are "mutually exclusive", meaning that if one modality is true, the others are wrong. On the other hand, modalities obtained in different contexts are generally not mutually exclusive: they are said to be "incompatible", meaning that if one modality is true, one cannot tell whether the others are true or wrong. This terminology applies to modalities, not to contexts, that are classically defined: changing the context results from changing the measurement apparatus at the macroscopic level, that is, "turning the knobs". These definitions allow us to state the following quantization principle:
(i) For each well-defined system and context, there is a discrete number N of mutually exclusive modalities; the value of N is a property of the system within the set of all relevant contexts, but does not depend on any particular context.
(ii) Modalities defined in different contexts are generally not mutually exclusive, and they are said to be "incompatible".
Otherwise stated, whereas infinitely many questions can be asked, corresponding to all possible contexts, only a finite number N of mutually exclusive modalities can be obtained in any of them 3 . An essential consequence is that it is impossible to get more details on a given system by combining several contexts, because this would create a new context with more than N mutually exclusive modalities, contradicting the above quantization principle. As shown in [7] , this makes that quantum mechanics must be a probabilistic theory, not due to any "hidden variables", but due to the ontology of the theory. Looking for instance at photon polarization, the number N = 2 makes it impossible to define a (certain and repeatable) modality corresponding to the photon being transmitted through a polarizer oriented at 0
• , and through a polarizer oriented at 45
• , because then there would be 4 such modalities, in contradiction with N = 2. Therefore the only relevant question to be answered by the theory is: given an initial modality in context C 1 , what is the conditional probability for obtaining another modality when the context is changed from C 1 to C 2 ? This probabilistic description is the unavoidable consequence of the impossibility to define a unique context making all modalities mutually exclusive, as it would be done in classical physics. It is therefore a joint consequence of the quantization and CSM principles, i.e. that modalities are quantized, and require a context to be defined 4 .
IV. ABOUT THE EPR-BELL ARGUMENT

A. The EPR-Bohm argument
We can now discuss in more details the EPR argument [10] 5 and Bell's theorem [4, 5] . To do so, let us consider two spin 1/2 particles in the singlet state, shared between Alice and Bob. The singlet state is a modality among four mutually exclusive modalities defined in a context relevant for the two spins, where measurements of the total spin (and any component of this spin) will certainly and repeatedly give a zero value. On the other hand, the singlet state is incompatible with any modality attributing definite values to the spin components of the two separate particles in their own (spatially separated) contexts. According to the previous section, the singlet modality is thus certain and repeatable in its own context (e.g., measurement of the total spin), but can only provide probabilities for the values of the spin components of the two separate particles.
B. What happens on Bob's side ?
Now, let us assume that Alice performs a measurement on her particle, far from Bob's particle. Alice's result is random as expected, but what happens on Bob's side? Since Bob's particle is far away, the answer is simply that nothing happens. How to explain the strong correlation between measurements on the two particles? By the fact that after her measurement, Alice can predict with certainty the state of Bob's particle; however, this certainty applies jointly to the new context (owned by Alice) and to the new system (owned by Bob). The socalled "quantum non-locality" arises from this separation, and the hidden variables from the impossible attempt to attribute properties to Bob's particle only, whereas properties must be attributed jointly to Alice's context and Bob's system. Getting them together is required for any further step, hence the irrelevance of any influence on Bob's system following Alice's measurement. Here the separation between context and system is particularly obvious and crucial, since they are in different places.
C. What and where is the "reality" ?
According to the above reasoning, after Alice's measurement on one particle from a pair of particles in a singlet state, the "reality" is a modality for Bob's particle, within Alice's context. But Bob may also do a measurement, independently from Alice, and then the "reality" will be a modality for Alice's particle, within Bob's context. Does that mean that we have two "contradictories" realities ? Actually no, because these realities are contextual [16, 17] : for instance Alice's modality tells that if Bob uses the same context as Alice, he will find with certainty a result opposite to Alice's one (given the initial singlet state). This statement is obviously true, as well as the one obtained by exchanging Alice and Bob. But if Bob does a measurement in another context (different from Alice's), then one gets a probabilistic change of context for a N = 2 system, as described before.
If Alice and Bob both do measurements with different orientations of their analyzers, the simplest reasoning is to consider the complete context for both particles, which is initially a joint context (with a modality being the singlet state) and finally two separated contexts, again with 4 possible modalities due to the quantization postulate. Then this is now a probabilistic change of context for a N = 4 system, again with the same result.
D. Where does CSM differ from Bell's hypothesis ?
It is interesting to write a few equations about these initial, "intermediate" and final modalities, because this allows us to see more explicitly where CSM differs from Bell's hypothesis, even before the quantum formalism is introduced. So let us denote a i , b j the modalities with results i, j = ±1 for some orientation (context) a for Alice, and b for Bob. Given some "hidden variables" λ, and using the vertical bar "|" as the usual notation for conditional probabilities p(X|Y ), the core of Bell's hypothesis is to assume the factorisability condition :
The equivalent CSM equations, given the initial joint modality µ, are for Alice, who knows µ and a i
whereas they are for Bob, who knows µ and
It is clear that Eqs. (2, 3) differ from Bell's hypothesis Eq. (1), and therefore Bell's inequalities can be violated in the CSM framework, without requiring any action at a distance, or faster than light signalling. However, there is some non-locality, in the sense that the result on one side depends on the result on the other side; but this is only through a (local) redefinition of the context, not through any influence at a distance onto the remote particle. Again, it is essential to consider that the modality belongs jointly to the particle(s) and to the context, and not to the particle(s) only, otherwise one would be lead to Bell's hypothesis.
E. Does CSM agree with QM, and why ?
Another important consequence is that if Alice and Bob both do measurements, their realities must ultimately agree together, since there will be a unique final modality (a i , b j ). Therefore their predictions must also agree together, and one must have
These equations are just the same as the ones we would obtain by the usual "instantaneous reduction of the wave packet", though in our reasoning there is no wave packet, and no reduction, but only a measurement performed by either Alice or Bob on the known initial modality µ. Even more, if we admit that (µ, a i ) is a new modality for Bob, and (µ, b j ) is a new modality for Alice, then p(b j |µ, a i ) or p(a i |µ, b j ) cannot be anything else than the one-particle conditional probabilities; for instance, it will be the usual Malus law for polarized photons.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that from a physical point of view, the modality (µ, a i ) obtained after Alice's measurement on the entangled state is exactly the same as the one that would be obtained by transmitting a single particle in this same modality from Alice to Bob. This equivalence between an entanglement scheme and a "prepare and measure" scheme has been extensively used in security proofs of quantum cryptography.
So we get a simple explanation about the famous "peaceful coexistence" between QM and relativity, i.e. why quantum correlations are non-local, but also "no signalling" (they don't allow one to transmit any faster than light signal): this is because when Alice makes a measurement, the change from µ to (µ, a i ) corresponds to a change of context, and not to any influence at a distance. This change of context (from joint to separate) redefines a new modality, which always involve both a system and a context. Such a situation, though strongly non-classical, does not conflict with physical realism or causality: in the CSM perspective, quantum non-locality is a direct consequence of the bipartite nature of quantum reality. In this rich discussion it is correctly pointed out that an essential hypothesis of "classicality" (or classical realism) is embedded in Bell's hypothesis. But according to CSM, it is not correct to claim that removing this hypothesis, and moving to some form of quantum realism, should eliminate all problems with locality. Everything will be fine as far as relativistic causality is concerned, but a fully non-classical form of non-locality will remain, due to the fact that the context and the system can be in different places. This would make no sense classically, but it is essential in a quantum framework, and explains why Bell's hypotheses do not hold. The CSM approach is the best way we know to spell out this specifically quantum non-locality, which does not imply any "spooky action at a distance".
V. CONCLUSION
Beyond the previous discussion on the EPR-Bell argument, CSM can answer several ontological questions posed by QM. In what follows, we conclude this paper with a short review of some other topics that this new perspective can help clarify. As this is being done, realism is again asserted, and objectivity is maintained, when applied to contexts, systems and modalities.
Quantum realism and ontology. Contextual objectivity [16, 17] allows for a quantum ontology, as the joint reality of the context, system, and modalities (CSM). This allows us to interpret quantum nonlocality as the situation where the context and the system are separated in space. Such a situation has no conflict with physical realism, but is irrelevant in classical physics, where the physical properties are carried by the system alone.
Accepting the shifty split. For many physicists, putting the context at the very heart of the theory implies an unacceptable "shifty split" [14, 18] between the quantum world (of the system) and the classical world (of the context). A lot of efforts have been made to get rid of it, and to make the classical world emerge from the quantum world, by attempts to describe contexts within the quantum formalism. Such attempts may exploit the fact that there is a lot of flexibility for defining the boundaries of the system, especially when considering that (weak or strong) measurements can be done by entangling the initial system with more and more "ancillas", leading to the so-called "Von Neumann regression" [26] .
But in our approach, extending measurements to include the context is self-contradictory: even by adding many ancillas, the system can never grow up to the point of including the context, simply because without the context, modalities cannot be defined. In other words, looking at the system as a fuzzy object including everything is not consistent with our physically realist ontology. The quantum-classical boundary has therefore a fundamental character, both from a physical and from a philosophical point of view [7] . Without restricting the generality nor the applicability of QM, the CSM approach acknowledges that, as a scientific discipline, QM "can explain anything, but not everything" [27] .
The Copenhagen point of view. In its practical consequences CSM is close to the usual Copenhagen point of view (CPV), so it may be interesting to discuss also the differences. A crucial one is that quantum reality as defined in CSM deviates from CPV, where reality is rather a word to be avoided [6] . Whereas CPV may be accused of dogmatism (hidden behind mathematical formulas), the ontological claims of CSM have some flavor of empiricism, or phenomenology: their goal is to provide a physically realist view of QM "as it is done", including in all the recent BI tests.
Decoherence theory. The practical side of CSM vs CPV can also be illustrated by considering "decoherence theory" [28, 29] . Considering that in an actual measurement, the system interacts with ancillas, entanglement is created, and observations are made, decoherence theory provides criteria to decide when and why a "big" ancilla does not behave as a quantum system any more. But this is done by using QM, and thus -in the CSM view -this only makes sense with respect to an external context, always required for defining modalities and using the quantum formalism [29] . Said otherwise, starting from a vector |ψ in an Hilbert space, and then trying to "deduce" the classical world, appears as circular by construction, because (from the beginning) |ψ is a mathematical object associated with a modality, i.e. with a phenomenon involving both the "classical" and "quantum" worlds. Therefore decoherence theory perfectly fits within CSM, being admitted that the goal is not to reconstruct the classical world (it is already there) but to show that QM is a consistent theory. Said otherwise, QM is extraordinarily efficient for managing the "split", but cannot get rid of it, because it is built within the quantum ontology and expressed in the quantum formalism -loosely speaking, as the difference between observables (contexts) and states (modalities).
The Bohr-Einstein debate. As a final remark, Bohr's arguments in [12] were quite right, but perhaps failed to answer a major question asked in essence by EPR in [10] : can a physical theory be "complete" if it does not provide an ontology that should be clearly compatible with physical realism ? Unveiling such a realistic quantum ontology is what is proposed by our approach.
